Introduction
When the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) morphed into the WTO, one of the crucial changes made was the addition of intellectual property rights. Membership in the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) was the new feature that would protect intellectual property rights. Not surprisingly, since its inception it has been surrounded by controversy. In its favor, TRIPS could be viewed as a protection of property rights. However, to the contrary, certainly it cannot be overlooked that patents, copyrights and trademarks represent artificial barriers to entry in the marketplace. One might see it as a vehicle that takes from the developing nations and gives to the developed nations by providing them with monopoly power.
Of course, the addition of TRIPS to the WTO was made with the expressed purpose of improving international trade among members. But, it must be asked whether we should expect this new aspect to improve international trade. The WTO certainly does! But, does the data support this claim? Gould and Gruben (1996) find that intellectual property rights promote economic growth, especially in open economies. Maskus (2000) goes farther and claims that intellectual property rights are a crucial element of increased international trade and economic growth. He even addresses TRIPS. He suggests that it should be made stronger, not weaker. He ________________________________________________________________________ Patents exist to compensate inventors and innovators for their contributions to society. The incentive to commit to numerous hours of investigation is promoted. Agents can feel secure in knowing that their discoveries and innovations will be protected by intellectual property law. In a sense, trademarks, copyrights and patents protect the property rights of inventors and innovators. If not for these, any potential rewards from a discovery and/or innovation could not be guaranteed.
Imagine a medicine being created that successfully combats cancer. It only seems right that the creators of this medicine should reap the rewards for the effort they put forth in making this discovery. If any competitor, having sacrificed neither time nor money in research, could simply take their idea and reap the rewards of this discovery, it would not seem fair. Of course, these are normative statements. Policymakers should only be concerned about the social benefits of either having or not having intellectual property laws. The fundamental question is not what is fair, but rather would these discoveries and innovations be made without this protection? Does protection of intellectual property help or hurt entrepreneurship? The prevailing view among policymakers is that they foster an atmosphere for new discoveries and innovations. Entrepreneurship thrives. They represent a reward for those who devote time and energy to creating new products and solving difficult problems. Without trademarks, copyrights and patents less inventions and innovations would be undertaken since the rewards would be smaller, if existent at all. Thus, conventional wisdom suggests that intellectual property law offers protection to potential entrepreneurs.
But is this truly the case? Protection of intellectual property rights also represent a barrier to entry. In fact, those protected by intellectual property law are guaranteed monopoly power for many years.
i Prices of protected products are almost always higher and production less than when their protection runs out. Is this not bad for consumers and society as a whole? So, we know that developing nations need new technology to become developed and that they will most likely acquire this technology from abroad. The question remains as to how they should do so. Does TRIPS help foster an environment of protected property rights in developed nations? Or does it create a barrier that keeps them from acquiring new inventions and innovations? Taylor (1993 Taylor ( , 1994 ) develops a two-country theoretical model to measure the impact of intellectual property rights on trade; he concludes that patent protection is important. In an OLS framework Delgado et al (2013) find empirical support for TRIPS promoting increases in trade, but their study is limited to certain sectors and does not look at trade between specific countries. Ferrantino (1993) estimates a gravity model using US data only and finds no impact of intellectual property rights on trade. Maskus and Penubarti (1995) find ambiguous results concerning the effect of patent laws on trade.
This paper uses as a proxy for intellectual property the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). We look at the initial phasing in of the TRIPS agreement immediately following Uruguay Round Agreement, specifically the period from 1986 through 1999. The reason it is important to isolate this time period is that this was the experimental phase in which some non developed nations were allowed to be members of the WTO without adhering to TRIPS. After 1999, almost all were forced to adhere to both the WTO and TRIPS. Some countries classified as least developed were given exceptions after 1999 but the bulk of the members had to adhere to TRIPS after 1999. Therefore, looking outside of this time period would not allow for this variation that we seek to properly test the effects of TRIPS on trade. We find that intellectual property rights appear to be negatively correlated with our proxy for international trade. Furthermore, this result holds for cases where only one trade partner is member of TRIPS. In the literature, gravity models are typically used to study bilateral trade.
ii Here, we do the same. An augmented gravity model is used to estimate the effect of TRIPS on international trade. Basic gravity models control for distance between trading partners and economic size of trading partners. In this gravity model we not only control for those factors and TRIPS, but for other trade agreements as well. Also, there are controls for other factors that are known to influence international trade, such as cultural, historical and geographical factors.
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) show that due to the possible presence of heteroskedasticity, estimation of gravity models using OLS can result in biased and inconsistent estimates. They propose a pseudo-maximum likelihood method of estimation which can be performed using a Poisson model. We do this as well.
Section 2 discusses trade agreements in general and gives a bit of background on WTO and the arrival of TRIPS. Section 3 lays out the empirical methodology that is used. Section 4 discusses the data and Section 5 goes over the results with some minor robustness checks. Section 6 adds some more robustness analysis and section 7 concludes.
A Word on Trade Agreements and Further Review of the Literature
The usual stated purpose of trade agreements is to increase the per capita welfare of its members. Those that adhere to these agreements benefit from an environment of open trade. By reducing or eliminating trade barriers, trade restrictions and trade subsidies, international trade among members is expected to increase and so too is the per capita income among trading partners. In these agreements members follow the rules for fear of not being included in future trade. Supposedly, the gains from being a member are so great that the opportunity costs of non-being a member are enough to make these agreements binding.
One of the earliest trade agreements is the GATT. It was started shortly after World War II and as stated earlier with the typical purpose that trade agreements have-to promote economic growth mainly in Europe, but also among certain Allied nations outside of Europe.
iii All told, 23 nations formed the first entrants into GATT. GATT would continue to grow and exist until 1986. After nearly 40 years, membership had risen to 75 members and over 60,000 tariffs had been eliminated. This represented over 350 billion dollars worth of tariffs that were eliminated.
iv GATT would not end out of failure, however. Rather it was its apparent success that created a desire for a more ambitious trade agreement.
Out of the Uruguay Round trade negotiation from 1986 to 1994, the World Trade Organization (WTO) would emerge. The WTO expanded open trade policy both in scope and in scale. Its 150 members represent almost the entire world and it covers services, capital investment, agriculture and not the least, intellectual property.
v Intellectual property rights are covered by TRIPS. They are divided into two principal categories: Copyright and rights related to copyright; and industrial property. The former affects literary authors, artists, performers, and producers of entertainment/multi-media groups. By protecting their endeavors, the general claim is that creativity is not only encouraged, but it is rewarded as well. The latter category concerns industrial property. Trademarks, geographical indications, inventions (or patents), industrial designs and trade secrets fall into this group. Again, the goal is to stimulate and reward entrepreneurial activity. Interestingly, not all of the WTO member nations are subject to the rules concerning intellectual property. Certain developing nations and all least developed countries were granted a transition period. This is a curious tidbit since TRIPS is supposed to help economic growth through increased international trade and it would seem that these nations would need this stimulus the most. These nations can be found in Table 1 below; they are indicated with an asterisk. vi Finally, there are regional agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Union (EU). These have similar goals as GATT and WTO, but their aim is to have regional scope rather than global coverage. There are many of these regional trade blocs with some having more prestige than others. Turkey, for example, is much more interested in being a part of the EU than the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) or the Agadir. While Morocco, which is a full member in the Agadir, would gladly switch to the EU if given the chance. Both most likely view the EU as more promising for economic growth.
So far, we have assumed as do most that these trade agreements actually increase international trade and thus economic growth. But, is that the case? We do know that world trade has increased over the last half century, but should this be attributed to trade agreements? Rose (2004) finds that this is not the case. In fact, he shows that trade patterns among WTO member and non-member nations hardly differ. The same result is found for the earlier GATT period. Oddly enough, in his study the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) seems to have an impact. This is striking since the GSP is an agreement that allows for WTO members to be exempt from the agreement in certain cases. However, the GSP should not be confused with a move away from open trade, rather it is actually an exemption that allows developed countries to lower tariffs with developing ones. Essentially, it permits richer countries to favor certain, selected poorer ones. Generally, the WTO does not allow for this practice.
For regional trade agreements the news is mixed. Romalis (2005) finds that NAFTA and Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) have had minimal impact on economic growth for its members. Frankel and Rose (2002) discovered that currency unions have a powerful and positive impact on trade among members. Whalley (1996) suggest that non-trade objectives may be more important that trade objectives when nations decide to join regional trade agreements. As stated earlier, the concern here is whether intellectual property rights, specifically TRIPS, help increase international trade? The WTO would say that TRIPS does. Here, we examine this empirically.
Empirical Methodology
In order to measure the impact that TRIPS has on international trade, we employ an augmented gravity model. Statistically speaking, gravity models have a very long and successful track record of explaining variations in international trade. vii They tend to produce reasonable results that are consistent throughout the literature. The basic gravity model captures the effects of distance and output on international trade.
The major criticism of gravity models is that they have weak microeconomic foundations. Bergstrand (1985) points out that while empirically gravity models are very accurate at describing changes in trade, they suffer from misspecification due to the omission of specific price variables. He uses a theoretical model to show this. While this may hamper their predictive power, it does not change their descriptive accuracy. Given that the aim of this paper is to understand changes in trade, not to predict them, a gravity model seems reasonable. By augmenting the basic gravity model, other variables that are thought to affect international trade can be included as well. Following Rose (2004) and Leeson (2008) , both "natural" and "man-made" variables that influence trade are controlled for. These variables can be broken down into several categories-culture, history, politics and geography. For example, cultural variables include whether the countries involved in trade share a common language or not; historical variables include whether one of the trade partners was a colony of the other or not; political variables capture whether the trading partners are members of any trade agreements; finally, geographical variables take into account whether the trading partners are island nations. The goal is to control for as many variables that are known to affect trade as possible so that the effect that TRIPS has can be isolated.
We only look at the period from 1986 through 1999. As stated earlier, this time period was unique in that some WTO members were allowed to be exempt from TRIPS. In order to capture this variation we isolate our study to this time period. The variables used in this analysis are described in Table 2 below. Table 3 follows Table 2 and gives the descriptive statistics of the variables. The augmented gravity model is specified as follows:
where i and j represent trading partners at time t and ε ijt are the other influences on bilateral trade that have been omitted. The log of the distance between i and j . Source: Rose (2004) . Log product real GDP The log of the product of real GDP of i and j at time t . Source: Rose (2004) . Log product real GDP per capita The log of the product of real GDP per captita of i and j at time t . Source: Rose (2004) .
Log product area The log of the product of the land areas of i and j in square kilometers. Source: Rose (2004) . Common colonizer A binary "dummy" variable that equals one if both i and j were colonies under the same colonizer and zero otherwise. Source: Rose (2004) .
Current colony A binary "dummy" variable that equals one if either i or j were colonies of each other at time t and zero otherwise. Source: Rose (2004) .
Ever colony A binary "dummy" variable that equals one if either i and j were ever colonies of each other at any time and zero otherwise. Source: Rose (2004) .
Common country A binary "dummy" variable that equals one if i and j were ever under the same country at any time during the sample and zero otherwise. Source: Rose (2004) .
Table 2 -Description of variables
We estimate the augmented gravity model using OLS. We use the fixed effects model. We control for year fixed effects in the benchmark results, but we also control for country-pair fixed effects.
Due to concerns of heteroskedasticity, we estimate the Poisson model as follows:
Equation 2 differs from equation 1 only in that the dependent variable is in levels. The interpretation of the parameters remains the same. These results are given in Table 4 as well.
Data
Most of the data from this paper was obtained from Rose (2004) . The original source for the trade data is the Direction of Trade (DoT) CD-ROM from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). One hundred thirty-one nations are included. The data is annual and covers the time period from 1986 to 1999. There are gaps in the data. All trade data is in real terms. There are 98,513 observations.
As mentioned in Section 2, Table 1 provides a list of all the countries included in this study. Countries listed in bold were members of the WTO at the beginning of our sample period. If they joined the WTO afterwards, a date is given to indicate when they joined WTO. Also, if they have an asterisk then this indicates that they do not belong to TRIPS, but are members of the WTO. Of course, countries in bold with no asterisk are members of both. If there is no date, it means that they are a member neither of the WTO nor of TRIPS.
Other sources as given by Rose (2004) are the Penn World Tables, the World Bank and the IMF, as well as the CIA's World Factbook. Table 2 above gives a description of the data. Table 4 gives the results both for OLS and pseudo-maximum likelihood estimations. The first and third columns are the benchmark regressions accounting for only year fixed effects. The second and fourth columns show the country-pair fixed effects regressions. All regressions control for year fixed effects.
Results
While across all of the regressions there are some different results, the important features of the gravity model remain. Distance is negatively correlated with international trade. The farther two trading partners are from each other the less likely they are to trade. Also, large economies tend to trade more. Both of these classic gravity model results from the literature are found here as well. For the rest of the discussion the default results (i.e., the first column) will be referred to unless specified otherwise.
When both trading partners are members of TRIPS, the effects are negative and significant, both economically and statistically, on international trade. This is true in all of the regressions. For example, for the default regression when both members are part of TRIPS trade can be expected to decrease by approximately 26 percent. viii This result is robust across all estimations and for country-pairs as well. Additionally, the consequences of having just one member in TRIPS is also robust. The expectation is that trade will fall by 17 percent.
ix In the default regression, most of the variables are in line with those estimated by Rose (2004) . Surprisingly, the ones that are not are the WTO variables-the Table D gives the OLS and Pseudo-maximum likelihood estimations for both year fixed effects and Country-pair fixed effects. *** indicates significance at the 0.01 level; ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level; * indicates significance at the 0.1 level. Standard errors are given in parenthesis. Our results differ from the prediction given by Taylor's theoretical models (See Taylor 1993 and 1994) in that patent protection as measured by TRIPS does not seem important for international trade. Also, unlike Delgado et al (2013) we do not find that TRIPS increases trade. As stated earlier, their study focused only on certain sectors and did not investigate trade between specific countries. Other studies that are comparable to ours (Ferrantino, 1993 and Maskus and Penubarti, 1995) found either ambiguous results or no results concerning the effect of patent laws on trade. Here, we do find a negative relationship of patent laws on trade when using the TRIPS agreement as a proxy for patent laws.
Robustness Analysis
To check for robustness we look at several sub-samples. We looked at regional groups and income groups. All of the general gravity results hold up in each sub-sample. Distance is a deterrent to trade and wealth and size are catalysts for trade. The BothinTRIPS coefficient is still negative and significant. The OneinTRIPS coefficient is for the most part; it loses significance for the East Asia and the high income sub-samples when using pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation. For example, two trading partners from subSaharan Africa that adhere to the TRIPS agreement can expect trade diversion of about 28%; if only one adheres to TRIPS, then the trade diversion is smaller in magnitude at 19%.
For two high income trading partners, the expected trade diversion from both being members of TRIPS would be 33% and if only one is a member of TRIPS, trade diversion is around 23%. Given that trade diversion is greater than in the benchmark result, this suggests that high income countries do not benefit from intellectual property protection. These results are given in Table 5 .
Conclusions
The findings here seem to indicate that intellectual property rights, as measured by adherence to TRIPS, when applied to both trading partners have an indirect effect on international trade. The results appear to be extremely robust. Even in sub-samples the effect of intellectual property rights on trade is economically large and statistically significant. The results also conformed to the standard gravity model results.
Furthermore, it also appears that when only one trading partner is a member of TRIPS this relationship holds. As eluded to earlier, the specific pair of trading partners may matter when only one is a member of TRIPS. For example, if the US (TRIP member) and China (non-TRIP member) are the trading pair, then we might expect there to be a positive impact on trade; however, if Cambodia (TRIP member) and Iceland (non-TRIP member) are the trading pair, we might not witness a positive impact on trade.
Our results suggest that TRIPS has a negative effect on international trade. We find this result to be robust not only to sample selection but also to estimation method as well. Table 5 gives the OLS and Pseudo-maximum likelihood estimations using both country-pair fixed effects for robustness analysis. *** indicates significance at the 0.01 level;** indicates significance at the 0.05 level; * indicates significance ii See Anderson (1979) , Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) , Rose (2004) and Leeson (2008 
